Written by Jekonia Tarigan

People groups around the world have different tradition of funeral ceremonies. Among Indonesia’s hundreds of cultures, there are a variety of funeral ceremony traditions. In conducting funerals, the focus is often on the various traditions and aspects of local belief systems. The June 16, 2022 discussion of funeral rites during the Kamisan Daring Forum centered on Hubula tribe in Papua and the Iban Dayak tribe in Kalimantan and the unique gender roles of these traditions. The forum was organized by the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS), the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), Center for Religious and Democratic Studies (PUSAD), Paramadina, Satunama Foundation, Institute of Sciences Indonesia (LIPI), and several other organizations. The first speaker in this forum was Korneles Siep from the Hubula tribe, one of the indigenous tribes in Papua. This tribe inhabits the mountainous area of central Papua, precisely in the Baliem Valley. The second speaker was Imanuel Febrianto Dagang, of the Iban Dayak indigenous group of Kalimantan.

In his presentation, Siep explained that the traditional Hubula society in Baliem Valley, Jayawijaya Regency, Papua, differentiated men and women in domestic and public life. [[i]] The roles of men and women in funeral ceremonies in the context of the Hubula tribe are also different. Siep explained that the funeral ceremony is one of the most important ceremonies for the Hubula tribe because this ceremony is full of respect. In the death ceremony in the Hubula tribe, men play larger role, both in decision making and in the implementation of each stage of the death ceremony itself. Men play roles ranging from welcoming guests who are greeted with tears to organizing events, where each guest comes with donations such as sweet potatoes and pork. It is the role of men to receive the gifts with lament. In the implementation of the event, the slaughter of pigs and the cooking and even distribution of pork are also taken care of by the men. After eating, the body will be cremated.

In the funeral ceremony of the Hubula tribe, women are relegated to a lesser role. Women take care of many of the necessities of the event, from waiting for the corpse to its eventual cremation. Women are responsible for welcoming guests to the interior of the house, where guests are greeted with cries and lamentations. During the preparation of the meal before the cremation of the body, all relatives and guests present will receive a meal, the distribution of the banquet will be carried out by men, in general, but also assisted by women. After the cremation is carried out, the role of men is strengthened again in the stage of paying off debts from donations that have been brought by guests and relatives.

Dagang from the Iban Dayak Indigenous Community conveyed a different story, where in the Iban Dayak community funeral ceremony, women have many roles. In preparation for the death ceremony, the women guard the corpse at the funeral home. This is called the Ruwai activity. Women (mothers) sleep in the funeral home with their hands on their pillows. The goal is to not sleep too well, so that the bereaved family and all those guarding the corpse are not disturbed by spirits. Women also play an important role in preparing and covering the corpse with woven cloth as a sign of respect. The women are also responsible for lighting the telok lamp and keeping it on during the funeral ceremony as a symbol of lighting the way for the deceased to go to the afterlife. According to Dagang, this tradition has been preserved even though most of the indigenous people of the Iban Dayak have embraced the Catholic religion.

Furthermore, Dagang explained that most of the necessities for the funeral ceremony were also prepared by women, such as mats, agricultural tools, looms, and various personal items including clothes from the deceased. This is due to the belief that the person who died is believed to still continue his daily activities in the afterlife as if he were still in this realm. Finally, in the funeral rituals, women also help. At the time of the funeral, a rooster is sacrificed whose head is left at the burial site. After the funeral process is complete, the women return to their role in preparing meals for all the families and guests present. Women work together to prepare food and complete the abstinence ritual after mourning. Therefore, it can be concluded that the role of women is very important in all rituals of death of the Iban Dayak tribe.

 

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[i] Yanuarious You, “Relasi Gender Patriarki Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Perempuan Hubula Suku Dani, Kabupaten Jayawijaya, Papua,” Sosiohumaniora 21, no. 1 (2019): 65–77. p. 65,  http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/sosiohumaniora/article/view/19335/10575

Written by Jekonia Tarigan

Death and the funeral process can be a rich source of inspiration for human efforts to find meaning in suffering, eternity in finitude. Religion, culture, social structures, and the vitality of these rudimentary elements of communal life depends upon ritually putting the corpse in its place, managing the relations between the living and the dead, and providing explanations for the existence of death. Throughout human history the problem of bodily decay has had to be solved in a meaningful way—the social body cannot function without agreed upon principles to respond to the universal presence of dead bodies. [[i]] This also happens in the context of Indonesian society with every religious and ethnic group having its own rich funeral traditions, formed as part of the culture and way of life of each ethnic group. At the Kamisan Daring Forum event on June 2, 2022, which was organized by the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS), the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Center for Religious and Democratic Studies (PUSAD) Paramadina, Satunama Foundation, Institute of Sciences Indonesia (LIPI) and several other organizations, raised a discussion entitled ‘Towards an Eternal Light: The Meaning of Death Ceremonies in Mentawai and Cilacap’. On this occasion, two speakers were present: Yosep Sagari from the Mentawai Indigenous Peoples Forum Community and Muslam Guno Waseso from the Association of Pangudi Mysticism Intisarining Rasa (Paguyuban Pikir) Cilacap, Central Java.

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[i] Gary Laderman, Rest in Peace: A Cultural History of Death and the Funeral Home in Twentieth-Century America,  (Oxford University Press, USA, 2003).

Recorded discussion: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npox0QksmkY&t=1027s

Written by Athanasia Safitri

Following the familiarization of the draft bill revision of the Indonesian criminal code (RKUHP) to the public in February-June 2021, the government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kemenkumham) highlighted 12 points, one of which touched on the issue of blasphemy. Two months ago, on 7 April 2022, Asean Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), represented by Eva K. Sundari, initiated a public discussion in collaboration with the Indonesian Commision of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS). Sundari opened the discussion, held via Zoom, by stating that the purpose of the meeting was to seek solutions for the many problems related to freedom of religion. From the government level, the final draft is targeted for June this year and there is a need to follow up with other organizations and institutions which share the same purpose. The idea is not only to get people ready for the legalization of the draft bill, but also to give space for the public so that the issue can be addressed urgently and to avoid the abuse of policy by the government in favor of certain religious groups.

Sakdiyah Ma’ruf moderated the event in which Dr. Zainal Abidin Bagir (Director of ICRS), and Fitria Sumarni (Ahmadiyah Law Committee of Indonesia) presented their views on RKUHP September 2019, especially as it pertains to blasphemy. Representatives from the government included Djoko Pudjirahardjo from the National Law Development Agency of Indonesia (BPHN), and members from parliament (DPR) were also invited to give their responses; Taufik Basari (member of Commision III) and Luluk Nur Hamidah (member of PKB party, Commision IV). The discussion was held to respond to the draft bill of RKUHP September 2019 which has two particular points related with penal law in religion and blasphemy. Blasphemy and issues of religious freedom are also mentioned in other laws such as UU no 1, 1965 article no 156a KUHP about blasphemy, and UU no 17, 2013 about mass organization which speaks about blasphemy and desecration, not to mention UU ITE and its revisions.

Religious and Interreligious Challenges We are Facing

Fitria Sumarni noted the many violations against human rights and the freedom of religion faced by the followers of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia including the enforcement of particular religious practice, disturbance to their worship places, the restriction and permit limitations to build worship places, physical assaults, and hate speech toward the members. The rejection by public officials to give Ahmadiyah followers the public services they deserve has been going on since 2013, which results in the delay of them obtaining ID cards, birth records, and marriage certificates mentioning the religion of the members. Other cases include the difficulties in land use, conducting religious activities, and building mosques. These problems occur in different provinces revealing this issue is not particular to one area. Ahmadiyah Law Committee represented by Sumarni, proposed several recommendations: a profound research study on blasphemy in the criminal justice code draft which involves academic scholars, human rights activists, and institutions; the deferment of RKUHP ratification; and the revision of UU no 1, 1965 to avoid the abuse of the bill for the benefit of specific religious groups.

Zainal Bagir later noted a shift in the definition of blasphemy where the target, scope, and the number of the cases have grown. Many abuses of the law on blasphemy have occured with overlapping justification and the discrimination toward minority religions has increased with allegations of blasphemy. Between 1965-2000, there were around 10 legal cases related to blasphemy while in the period of 2000-2015 there were more than 100 cases of blasphemy reported.

Bagir argued that some conflicts even were put upside down by giving an example of a case where someone in public threatened to kill alleged blasphemers. Meanwhile, a man who was threatened was blamed on account that he belonged to a minority group accused of conducting blasphemy. Ahmadiyah and Syi’ah are among the minority religious groups who are being mistreated by this law and by the sake of its enforcement. Some have raised the question as to whether it should be considered blasphemy when the majority violates the rights of the minority. Bagir continued by stating that this false repetition only leads to religious intolerance among our communities. He strongly suggested that the RKUHP review needs to be done in order to gather more recommendations from the existing experiences before the bill’s finalization.

Viewing Blasphemy Anew

The discussion continued with insights from Taufik Basari who agreed that there are many laws on blasphemy and the actions related to it. In our society now we have three points to consider regarding the implementation of the law on the issue of blasphemy. They are the way the law enforcement officers respond to the cases, the view from the people in the community, and the role of government toward the cases. The review of the law on blasphemy in a new way, with additional suggestions from religious activists and academic scholars, must be proposed immediately to the government and parliament. It is urgent to create advocacy, persuasion and strategy to enable this review process.

From the government, Djoko Pudjirahardjo added that the actualization of the existing penal law, also the one which was still under discussion, needs to be observed closely in order to make it finalized accordingly this June. Luluk Nur Hamidah from the parliament shared her thoughts focusing on the double standard of blasphemy when it comes to the point where the action is done by the people in the same religious community, or if it is conducted originally to adapt to the new interpretation of one religious teaching. There has not been a clear line about it and she suggested that what people may think as blasphemy can be in a form of new self actualization or conceptualization in the religious tradition. She argued this act to be considered as a new way toward enrichment in the way of thinking and culture in the society which needs to be evaluated and discussed instead of categorized as a nuisance to any particular religious doctrine.

The question and answer session concluded with invitation from all speakers and contributors to work together in ensuring that the law on blasphemy should not be a boomerang when finalized. Misconduct of the law must be reported to the authorities, especially when it is done to the minorities, to avoid being an incentive for intolerance among religious people. Therefore to combat intolerance, there should be more ways in looking anew that the problem does not lie on blasphemy and the actions related to it but more on the uniformity in determining the definition. It should be stated clearly in the bill as there are many interpretations of blasphemy. Furthermore, discussion with the government needs to be activated to boost the process of RKHUP revision. In order to make it succeed, RKHUP must be viewed eventually as the government’s legacy to take part in the restoration of justice, religious de-colonialism to create a more democratic state enriched by the same commitment with different religious backgrounds.

Recorded discussion: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6gX0UZKcoTA

Written by Maurisa Zinira

Political space has always been an arena of never-ending contestation due to competing political interests. Not surprisingly, in every general election period, political rhetoric amplifies and becomes divisive. Divisions constantly occur and often lead to acts of violence and criminality. The case of the 2019 presidential election is a real example of how political mobilization hardens identity politics. In this period, intolerance in its various forms was accepted as a matter of course and perpetuated through political practices that threatened social solidarity.

The heated political practice due to the high level of intolerance is recorded in the article by Risa J Toha et al. which was discussed at the eighth Reading in Social Science (RISOS) Forum entitled “Normalization of Intolerance in Indonesia: A Case Study of the 2019 Presidential Election”. The forum, which was held on May 25, 2022, featuring the article written by Risa J. Toha, Dimitar Gueorguiev, and Aim Sinpeng entitled “The Normalization of Intolerance: The 2019 Presidential Election in Indonesia” published in Electoral Studies 74 (2021) 102391. In their article, Toha et al discuss how political campaigning is correlated with increasing intolerance. They mentioned that the political leaders’ intolerant rhetoric during the presidential election campaigning affected the intolerant tendencies of their constituents. The forum, which was moderated directly by Zainal Abidin Bagir—the director of ICRS—invited Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Nathanael G Sumaktoyo as discussants.

Normalization of Intolerance in the 2019 Presidential Election

Normalization discussed in Toha et al’s article refers to the idea that the perceived social acceptability of intolerance is believed to drive individual intolerance. In the case of the 2019 presidential election, intolerant social acceptability was in line with the attitude and rhetoric of the candidates who attempted to win the hearts of their constituents. To see to what extent the campaigns of Indonesian presidential candidates have had an impact on this increase, Toha et al. compiled an online survey that started with two research questions, how normalization interacts with partisanship and influences tolerance and how normalization is strictly partisan.

To answer these two questions, Toha et al conducted an online survey of 1213 participants. The research was conducted in early April 2019, one week before the presidential election was held. Because the research design used an online tool, those who were recruited as participants were mostly young people who had access to the internet.

They were asked to select a number of statements divided into three categories: control treatment, norms treatment, and a motto, covering the issue of diversity and attitudes towards different groups. As a result, the study found that voters tend to refuse to choose leaders from among those they do not like, such as non-Muslims, non-Javanese, or Chinese. Of the three, non-Muslims are the group most vulnerable to discrimination than non-Javanese and Chinese. This trend shows that even among young people, the rate of intolerance towards minority groups is still quite high.

This research also explains that the normalization of intolerance is driven by both social and political processes. Socially, people will move in a direction that seems socially acceptable. Those who are often exposed to intolerant messages will tend to enter into an environment that normalizes intolerance. On the other hand, those who are not exposed to messages of intolerance tend to enter a tolerant community. Meanwhile, politically, the content and targeting of intolerance will be consistent with a political pattern around the divisional elections. In other words, voters tend to follow the evolving political logic. Groups associated with intolerant campaigns will tend to express intolerant thoughts and behaviors because they assume that intolerant views are more acceptable. On the other hand, those who support a tolerance campaign will tend to think that intolerance is unacceptable. As a result, they are more motivated to support candidates who are perceived as tolerant.

This was how the narrative developed during the campaign season which was heavily influenced by the views and rhetoric of political leaders during the election period. The rhetoric of the two Indonesian presidential candidates—Prabowo and Jokowi—was considered to be correlated with increasing intolerance in Indonesia. Prabowo’s campaign was often seen as reinforcing intolerance towards non-Muslims because it positioned itself as a defender of Islam, while Jokowi’s campaign model tended to portray itself as a defender of tolerance and inclusiveness, in fact, it left intolerant messages towards ethnic Chinese as the campaign carried out counter-narratives against accusations of siding with China and rumors about an ethnic Chinese father.

Interestingly, Toha et.al mentioned that intolerance in the political sphere did not appear in their participants’ lives. They still took their children to school even though they were taught by teachers of different religions. They also still lived in their homes which were close to the places of worship of other religions and hung out with friends of different faiths. In other words, social acceptance of intolerance only worked in the political area and did not extend to everyday life outside of the contestation.

Presidential Election and Identity Politics

The 2019 presidential election which was full of identity politics is indeed an alarm for social cohesion. According to Burhanuddin Muhtadi, who was present at the forum as a discussant, identity politics works where the composition of religion (Muslim vs non-Muslim) and/or ethnicity is not unequal. Or, in other words, there is a primordial base that makes the region heat up. If an area does not have strong ethnic divisions, identity politics generally does not work. Therefore, he said that efforts to see the rate of intolerance must also be seen from the reality of the community on the ground because the increase of intolerance was not caused only by one factor. It’s not just the rhetoric of political leaders. Because it could be, not a political campaign that affects the constituents but rather the culture of intolerance among the constituents that causes political parties to choose to use less tolerant rhetoric.

In addition, he also noted that online research that was only conducted once before the election was prone to bias. This is because different survey models will lead to different conclusions. According to him, online surveys tend to attract educated participants, so the results seem to show that intolerance is reduced. Meanwhile, the reality on the ground is often more complex than the online surveys suggest. Thus, he recommended that research be conducted in various timescales to see whether the intolerant statements of the candidates really had an impact on increasing intolerance among voters.

Nathanael Sumaktoyo added that the reluctance not to vote for an unwelcome candidate could also be caused by negative partisanship. Negative partisanship presupposes a standard view of seeing the enemy, “the enemy of my enemy are my friends”. This can be seen, for example, in what he called “captured minority” such as the Shia and the Ahmadiyah, who may not vote because they like the candidate but because they are the enemy of the enemies of the minority group.

Sumaktoyo also mentioned the existence of moral licensing during the campaign season. Moral licensing is the legitimacy to do something awful because they feel they have done something decent. This can be seen in groups who think they are already tolerant of other groups, which in the end, moral feelings seem to legitimize their intolerant attitude. This is illustrated in Toha et al’s research that the claim of Jokowi’s constituents as a tolerant group makes them feel they have reasons to blame others.

The political dynamics of the 2019 presidential election are complex and full of intolerance, which is considered normal. As previously stated by Toha et al., this treatment of intolerance as something natural continues to be reinforced by the statements of political leaders. Especially with the existence of social media, those messages were constantly reproduced and shared among society members which further heated up the contestation and debates. If this political model continues, we can now predict the situation that may happen in 2024.

Written by Jekonia Tarigan

Religious dialogue, both intra-religious and inter-religious, takes place over a historical period and is colored by various dynamics, as well as ups and downs, which by studying them can be found wisdom in building religious dialogue in the future. [i]  This was conveyed by Fr. Dr. Martinus Joko Lelono, at the sixth installment of the Dialogues of Diversity forums organized by the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS). Lelono is an ICRS batch 2016 and currently serves as Chairman of the Commission on Inter-Religious and Trust Relations, East Yogyakarta Vicary. In this forum he delivered a presentation entitled “The Dynamics of Religious Dialogue in the Catholic Church”. The second speaker for the forum was Dr. Laila Kholid Alfirdaus, S. IP, MPP, a 2011 ICRS alumna who is now working as the Head of the Political Science Master’s Program at Diponegoro University. Alfirdaus delivered a presentation entitled “COVID-19, Diversity and Access to Public Service: Assessing Support and Challenges”.

Lelono, in his presentation, explained that according to Mgr. Francis X. Kriengsak Kovithavanij there are three different periods that can describe the dynamics of dialogue in the Catholic Church: First Period – Early Dialogue Period; Second Period – Period of Silence and Collapse of the Pillars of Dialogue; Third Period: Restarting the Dialogue. Christianity began with a small group of the followers of Jesus of Nazareth who later preached to many places. The movement gained a name as a Christian group in Antioch (Acts 11:26), a Greek city located in Pisidia, in the region of Lake Turkey, which is located on the border of Pisidia and Phrygia. Christianity began to gain influence because of his encounter with various cultures and philosophies. In historical developments, the Church began to assert itself as a separate group from Judaism (Acts 15) and thus took the form of a spiritual institution. Among the processes to define this form are the various efforts to adopt Greek philosophy, ancient religions, and Roman laws.

Sebastian Painadath, SJ, spiritual writer from India, noted, on the one hand, Christianity began to be admired for the mystical inspirations and philosophical thought they took from Greek philosophers. That is why they felt the need to raise the level of their culture by taking over Greek thought and thereby also developing theology by studying the categories generally used in Greek thought. On the other hand, Christianity distanced itself from Greek religion and cult practices because Greek religious mythology meant nothing to Christianity. The fidelity to the message and meaning of Jesus’ presence remained the basic norm in early Church teachings. Nevertheless, theology in religion developed in great openness. Justin Martyr and Irenaeus described Jesus as the Logos, an expression of light in Greek thought. Clement of Alexandria portrayed Jesus in terms of fulfillment theory, so that in this way he viewed other religions with more respect, not merely false religions which should be replaced by Christianity. However, the noise about the position of Christianity in the company of others began to be felt in Augustine’s thoughts. In his debates with Pelagius, Augustine began to advocate for exclusive ecclesiology. He argued that God’s grace had been given in Christ through the means of the Church and her sacraments. Thus, he said, “Embracing Christianity is the safest and surest way of salvation and outside the Church there is no salvation (Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus)” His teachings were developed by his student named Fulgentius, who said that not only the pagans but also the Jews and all the heretics and schismatics who die outside the Church will be sent to the endless fire that God has prepared for Satan and all his angels. This is where suspicion arises towards other religions and beliefs and there is a sense of being right in front of others.

Furthermore, according to Lelono, at the end of the 4th and early 5th centuries, Christianity had changed from a persecuted religion to a religion that was not only accepted, but even became the state religion of the Roman Empire. The church that developed in the catacombs (underground graves located in various cities of the Roman Empire, especially in the City of Rome) became a religion that was practiced in the basilicas. This religion then had authority and dominance, not only in the religious field but also in the fields of politics, economics, and intercultural arenas. Soon, Christian religious leaders became landlords who obtained land because of their special position. Such a position made the Church change from a religion that wants to be a friend of humans, to a religion that feels it has authority. In this case, the hierarchies had more dominance in determining the salvation of souls. Rules were established to impose doctrinal similarities and the abolition of pagan cultures. Attempts to convert people to Christianity in various places occurred more easily because of the principle of Cuius Regio Eius Religio (people must follow the religion of the regional leader). Unfortunately, the church, which sees itself as the visible Kingdom of God in the world, saw Islam spreading its religion in Europe as a threat, ultimately prompting the Crusades.

In its development, the spread of the Christian faith was accompanied by support from the colonial powers. Although found in some places as an exception, missionaries do not easily assert the existence of truth and grace in other religions. The mission is an attempt to strengthen the dominance. The dark times in this dialogue ended with the widespread independence of countries that were formerly colonized by Europeans after the end of World War II.

Finally, in the third period, the dialogue resumed again. According to Lelono, in the early to mid-20th century, several theologians and missionaries began to question the assumption of Christianity as the only source of salvation. Furthermore, doubts began to emerge that the victory of Christianity was determined by the increase in the number of people. This change of attitude was stated in the Second Vatican Council, a council initiated by Pope John XXIII, who introduced the Expression Aggiornamento (to celebrate). One of the outcomes of the Council was an attempt to discuss the relationship between the Catholic Church with churches outside the Catholic Church and with other religions. Originally, this Council did not want to talk at all about other religions and the Church as a whole, but only wanted to talk about Judaism, especially after the Holocaust and anti-Semitic attitudes that had lasted for almost 2000 years.

The Patriarchs of the Eastern Churches asked the Council not to say anything about Judaism unless it was about other religions. This refers to the fear that its effect might be seen as an acceptance of the nation of Israel. Moreover, this attitude can be dangerous to the small number of Christians in Arab countries. In the end, the choice was made to talk about Judaism and, at the same time, talk about other religions. At the Second Vatican Council, two documents that spoke of interreligious relations were signed, namely Dignitatis Humanae as a declaration of religious freedom and Nostra Aetate, a statement about the relationship of the Catholic Church to non-Christian religions.

The relationship of Christians who are not in union with the Catholic Church is discussed specifically in the document entitled Unitatis Redintegratio. Furthermore, during the leadership of Pope Francis, dialogue has grown, marked by the publication of several documents such as: Laudato Si (2015); Abu Dhabi Document (The Document of Human Fraternity) 2019 plus Visit to Abu Dhabi – February 2019; The Fratelli Tutti Document of 2020 and the visit of Pope Francis to Iraq in March 2021.

Alfirdaus, in her presentation, stated that there have been more than 6 million COVID cases and 137 thousand deaths until May 2022 in Indonesia. Alfirdaus’ research studied knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) in terms of COVID-19 mitigation based on related surveys. The research was facilitated by a project called “LEAN ON (Leave No One Behind)” by INVEST DM (USAID-promoted program in cooperation with Mercy Corps and BNPB) under the coordination of CIRCLE Indonesia. There are three main questions in her research: What are the current levels of knowledge and prevailing attitudes reported by members of the marginalized community related to COVID-19? What are the current practices reported by marginalized community members related to COVID-19? What are the needs of these people to further support them to mitigate the risk of COVID-19?

Alfirdaus argued that not all people have the access and ability to change regarding KAP, especially among those who are marginalized (people with comorbidities, women and children victims of and/or prone to violence, homeless groups, low-income workers, and gender minority groups). Government policy gives special attention to people with comorbidities, such as with HIV/AIDS, diabetes, severe cardiovascular disease, immunodeficiencies, and other communicable and non-communicable diseases.

Through the research, Alfirdaus found that marginalized communities have adequate knowledge about COVID-19, including the transmission of the virus through respiratory droplets of infected people and clinical symptoms of the disease. More than half of the respondents strictly adhered to health protocols. However, the KAP survey shows there is a discrepancy between knowledge that is not fully translated into higher perceived susceptibility, perceived self-efficacy, and perceived benefits, evidenced by lower absolute scores on attitude and practice components compared to the knowledge score. Therefore, she concludes that knowledge is an essential predicator of attitude, mainly perceived susceptibility, and perceived self-efficacy, which might contribute to practice behaviors among marginalized populations. Financial barriers may also disadvantage some communities’ practice of healthy behaviors by some communities. This confirms that the discrepancies in the effects are determined by the socioeconomic status of respondents.

 

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[i] Johannes B Banawiratma, Dialog Antarumat Beragama: Gagasan Dan Praktik Di Indonesia (Kerja Sama Penerbit Mizan Publika Dengan Program Studi Agama Dan Lintas Agama UGM), 2010, p.7-8, https://crcs.ugm.ac.id/books/

Written by Maurisa Zinira

The progress of Islamic studies in Indonesia is quite extensive. This can be seen from the variety of research models that have developed. Although the debate around Islam and the West is still ongoing and religious sectarianism remains strong, Indonesia’s intellectual climate is relatively open to various views and alternative ideas.

In her book Whose Islam? The Western University of Modern Islamic Thought in Islam, Megan Brankley Abbas said that modern Indonesian Islamic thought cannot be separated from the influence of Western universities. This book was discussed at the Reading in Social Science (RISOS) forum held April 22, 2002 entitled “Hantu Imperialisme Akademis? Universitas Barat dan Pemikiran Islam Modern di Indonesia” (The Ghost of Academic Imperialism? Western Universities and Modern Islamic Thought in Indonesia). In her book, Abbas argues that those who studied in the West returned to Indonesia and brought renewal to Indonesian Islamic thought. However, some circles are still haunted by negative stereotypes about the West. She asks whether is true that there is an imperialism agenda in the Western knowledge of Islam? To discuss the topic, the forum invited alumni of Western education such as Saiful Mujani, Yeni Ratna Yuningsih, and Zainal Abidin Bagir whose experiences resonate with what Megan addressed in the book.

Dualism vs Fusionism in Islamic Thought

Abbas’ book highlights the academic influence of Western universities on the development of Islam in Indonesia. The book is a refinement of her dissertation in the Department of History at Princeton University entitled “Knowing Islam: The Entangled History of Western Academia and Modern Islamic Thought“. Abbas’ main argument holds that the Western universities were not the only significant site for Muslim education but also the site to produce religious knowledge and authority. The universities had contributed to encouraging Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to develop their own religious traditions and promote an Islamic reform from within.

Abbas noted two models for seeing the relationship between Western and Islamic knowledge. The first is a dualistic way of thinking that sees the West and Islam as two different poles. This thought assumes that both are two largely independent discourses ontologically, epistemologically, and axiologically. They essentialize Western as secular and colonial. Meanwhile, Islam is pure and divine. They continuously put Islam and the West in contradictory ends and is impossible to reconcile. As the result, there is always constant high tension among the followers of each intellectual camp. It further extends not only to the academic area, but also to work, social life, the economy, and politics. In their assumption, the West always carries an imperialist agenda that has never benefited Islam. Therefore, they flatly reject the agenda of combining the two or simply borrowing one another’s academic framework.

The second way of thinking attempts to integrate the West and Islam. Abbas called this group “fusionists” because they tried to fuse the knowledge that emerged from the two. Fusionists appear as a response to the dualism which is considered disturbing because it rejects intellectual openness. Unlike dualists, fusionists believe that Islam and the West can collaborate in creating new knowledge and developing existing Islamic treasures through cross-discursive borrowings. For them, knowledge cannot be divided into Western or Islamic intellectual traditions. Instead, it is unified and has no borders. They, therefore, integrate Western academic methods into their normative writings on Islamic reform and likewise infuse Islamic principles and personal faith commitments into their academic research. Not only that but they are also required to be able to contribute both to Islamic studies and to Western methods.

Efforts to develop fusionism have started since the early generations of Indonesian Muslims studied at McGill University. It was around 1951 that Wilfred Cantwell Smith established The McGill Institute of Islamic Studies as a space for encounters between Western academics and Muslim intellectuals. He envisioned those Western scholars learning from Muslims about Islam as a lived religion. On the other hand, Muslims can learn methods from their western counterparts in terms of scientific development through critical methods.

Smith continued to encourage the growth of fusionism by emphasizing the objectivity of academic work. However, he criticized the tendency of academics to define objectivity with a critical distance from the position of an outsider. This tendency causes them to lose empathy for the society they study. Therefore, Smith encourages fusing objective research methods and subjective modes of understanding to become an integral religious research model.

To that end, he made a special policy to encourage Muslim involvement in Islamic studies at the institution he led. He filled the study center with half Muslim intellectuals and half Western academics, intending that those Western researchers would have a special sensitivity to Muslims, so they could understand how it feels to be in the observed community. Smith likens it to a “goldfish”—which is continuously observed from behind the glass. As for Muslims, Smith hoped that this policy would equip them with various resources and methodologies for the reform of Islamic thought. The study center introduced Muslims to self-critical awareness which encourages Muslims to look at their traditions critically, not to undermine Islam, but to find things that need to be evaluated and improved.

Muslim intellectuals who completed their study were expected to return to their home countries to disseminate their new research methods and serve as an intellectual catalyst for Islamic revival. In Indonesia, several Indonesian figures who became the first generation in this thought program, such as Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution, then initiated various programs that encouraged the renewal of Islamic thought through the academic and political realms of government.

Fusionism in Indonesia

The thought of fusionism that developed in Indonesia cannot be separated from the role of Muslim intellectuals who studied in the West. Six years after its establishment, McGill University inaugurated the first student from Indonesia, Mukiti Ali, who had completed his master’s studies in 1957. He was then followed by Anton Timur Djaelani (MA, 1959), Tedjaningsih Djaelani (MA, 1959), Mochtar Naim (MA, 1960), and Kafrawi Ridwan (MA, 1969). In 1968, Harun Nasution became the first doctoral student from Indonesia. Through the involvement of these figures, especially Mukti Ali at the Ministry of Religion and Harun Nasution at IAIN (State Institute for Islamic Studies) Syarif Hidayatullah, more and more Muslim scholars were sent to Western universities.

Even so, not all who traveled to the West agreed with fusionism. Rasjidi, a Muslim figure who was contracted by McGill to collaborate, actually expressed his discomfort with his colleagues at the institute. He had a heated argument with Joseph Schacht, who was then a guest lecturer, and declared that Muhammad borrowed pre-Islamic traditions because he did not have a political concept to settle disputes in Medina. He also rejected Smith’s view that Muslim apologetics tend to glorify Islamic traditions with no critical review of their tradition. In response to that, Rasjidi argued that normative Islamic scholars actually see the wealth of Islamic scholarship which is far more developed than Western scholarship. Four years after his fiery exchange with Schacht, Rasjidi’s contract ended. In Indonesia, Rasjidi joined the Indonesian Islamic Da’wah Council (DDII) which actively criticized the West and Indonesian fusionist thinkers who were deemed to be distorting Islam.

Meanwhile, Mukti Ali and other McGill alumni continued to strive for the transformation of Islamic thought. Upon his return from McGill, Ali was active at IAIN Yogyakarta and developed the Comparative Religion Program. Not long after, he was appointed Minister of Religion under the New Order government. During this period, he found a common mission with the New Order which was trying to shift religious traditionalism. Ali and his colleagues seemed to be gaining momentum. He developed many policies that encourage the development of fusionist thinking, either by designing learning curricula like at McGill, inviting professors from Western universities such as Leonard Binder and Fazlur Rahman from Chicago, or sending bright young thinkers to continue their studies in the West as an effort to regenerate Indonesian modern Muslim intellectuals.

This policy has had a huge impact on Indonesian Islam. If the early fusionist generation such as Ali and Nasution were generally reluctant to acknowledge the limitation of academic knowledge, the younger scholars openly wrestled with the issue of epistemological imperialism. They started to insert a postcolonial-postmodern approach into their perspective. Amien Rais, for example, mentions that the modern and traditional division between the West which is considered rational and advanced, and the East as irrational and backward only shows Western neocolonial domination through academic language. He warned fellow Muslim intellectuals to not wrestle with Western methods without critical remarks because not all of them will match the reality of Indonesian Muslims. Amin Abdullah, as a fusionist, has the same opinion. According to him, epistemological imperialism will continue until Muslims manage to offer a persuasive alternative.

If Amien Rais and Amin Abdullah focused on methodological aspects, Nurcholis Madjid developed a postcolonial approach to challenge the reification of Islam into a bounded religious tradition. He proposed that Indonesian Muslims reject their reified tradition and instead embrace an inclusive and individualist mode of spirituality. He believed that Islam is universal. It embraces all forms of spirituality and legitimizes many forms of knowledge, including Western academic knowledge that benefits Islam for a reform.

Western Academia and the Ghost of Imperialism

Dualist thinkers do not hesitate to regard Western programs and knowledge as part of imperialism. Meanwhile, many fusionists adopt a post-colonial framework, tending to be wary of assessing Western knowledge to always contain an imperialist agenda. The fusionists mentioned by Abbas, for example, tend to show a utilitarian gesture that takes what can be used by Indonesian Muslims, while remaining critical of Western thought.

In his review of Abbas’ book at the RISOS forum, Saiful Mujani, who is also an intellectual who graduated from a Western university, emphasized that the Muslim community should not be haunted by stereotypes about the agenda of Western imperialism. According to him, the assumption about accusations of imperialism will not lead the Muslim community anywhere, because they will always be haunted by the fear that stops them from making progress. In his experience, Western universities provide helpful resources that support scholarship.

Slightly different, according to Zainal Abidin Bagir, epistemological imperialism does occur and must be minded. Epistemological imperialism was not necessarily conducted by the West, because in feminism, religious studies, and Islamic studies domination of knowledge also occurs. Therefore, a postcolonial study of knowledge is absolutely necessary. According to Bagir, we need to be reminded by figures who have different views from fusionists that the dominance of knowledge still exists and is strong. It is undeniable that Western academia has had an impact on modern Islamic thought in Indonesia, but we do need to continue to be disturbed, to be restless, and to look to alternatives for the development of knowledge.

Considering the growth of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and the knowledge exchanges,Yeni Ratna Yuningsih, an intellectual who graduated from McGill University and is now a policymaker at the Ministry of Religion, sees the need for the sustainability of the student exchange programs. For this reason, she argues that the Ministry of Religion needs to continue to collaborate with various universities, both in the East and the West, to enable the dynamics of reforming Islamic thought from time to time.

In the end, Abbas’s book provides an important description of the dynamics of the development of modern Islam in Indonesia. Her research should be placed as a study with a focus on the role of McGill and Chicago in Indonesia before the Reformation, therefore we can understand why many modern Indonesian Islamic figures who also color Islamic discourse are not discussed in the book. Apart from that, Abbas’ book is a significant study of the history of thought and needs to be continuously developed to see the influence of universities in the West on Indonesian Islam today.

Recorded discussion:
https://video.search.yahoo.com/search/video?fr=mcafee&ei=UTF-8&p=pusad+paramadina+youtube&type=E211US885G0#action=view&id=2&vid=ebdd0e74e1e4016d9ca0325303aed044

Wednesday Forum – 27 April 2022

The small, Indian Ocean island known as Sarandib, Lanka, and Ceylon was a site of banishment throughout the 18th century for members of royal families, convicts, servants and others sent there from across the Indonesian archipelago. Descendants of these exiles who remained on the island continued to speak and write in Malay, the archipelago’s lingua franca, and to adhere to a collective Muslim identity for several centuries and into the present. The talk considers if and how earlier religious and literary traditions of banishment tied to the island – those of Adam’s fall from paradise to Sarandib and Sinta’s abduction to Lanka – played a role in the lives of the early exiles and their descendants.

Professor Ronit Ricci teaches in the departments of Asian Studies and Comparative Religion at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Since 2013 she has been developing Indonesian Studies at the Hebrew University, the only Israeli university to offer this field of study. Her research interests include Javanese and Malay manuscript cultures, Translation Studies, and Islamic literatures of South and Southeast Asia. She is the Principal Investigator for the ERC-funded project “Textual Microcosms” (2021-2026) which will explore the phenomenon of interlinear translation across the Indonesian-Malay world.

Wednesday Forum – 2o April 2022

Religious extremism among students in major campuses in Indonesia remains a cause for concern for Indonesian government officials. Several social and political surveys, journal articles and scholar reports have presented and discussed the rise of religious extremism among youths in Indonesia. But few have discussed religious extremism among students in Indonesian universities. This webinar aims to explore what cause Indonesian university students to subscribe to extreme ideas of Islam and also, to analyse the effectiveness of government and campus policies in tackling student religious extremism in Indonesia major campuses. This webinar argues that university students are lured to subscribe to religious extreme ideas due to increasing religious extremism narratives in public or private spheres. These narratives are internalized in the minds of university students in systematic and structured ways, through regular meetings and online postings, and through public events such as webinars organized by student organizations that promote extreme ideas of Islam. The internalization of such ideology is exacerbated with the lack of narratives on moderate Islam in public and private spheres. The government and campus authorities have formulated and implemented strategies to tackle the religious extremism problems among university students, but they largely work in silos, hence their strategies are not fully effective. This webinar is based on, among others, in-depth interviews with student activists, campus authorities and government officials during a one-month-long fieldtrip in some major campuses in Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bandung between October and November 2021.

A’an Suryana, Ph.D. is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. His areas of interests are Good Governance, MinorityStudies, State Practices, National Security (Communal Violence, Conflict Resolution andTerrorism), Political Islam, Media Studies & Freedom of Information. His book, which is based on his dissertation, has been published by Routledge entiteled The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia: Minority Faiths and Vigilantism. He has also published in some reputable regional and international journals, including Asian Studies Review and South East Asia Research. This presentation is based on his publication from ISEAS-Trends in Southeast Asia 2022 series entitled “Religious Extremism in Major Campuses in Indonesia”.

Wednesday Forum – 13 April 2022

How can mutual understanding and exchanges among people of different cultures and ethnicities be supported in a manner that recognizes the variety of their worldviews and spatial-temporal-kinesthetic knowledge and cultural and spiritual values? In Diane’s experience, a practice-based approach to the art of intercultural dialogue does not stem from a predetermined method but rather is an organic process that grows from the interactions of the people involved, which will evolve differently in each place depending on its historical and current conditions. One approach that she has greatly appreciated in Indonesia, which has given good results, is by taking into account the place, time and conditions. With this in mind, she will share some aspects one might consider in the fostering of a common field for dialogue.

Diane Butler, PhD is a dance-movement artist, teacher and cultural program director who has collaborated with artists from varied cultures and faiths in the Americas, Europe and Asia for over 35 years and since 2001 resided in Bedulu and Tejakula in Bali, Indonesia. She co-founded Dharma Nature Time, an international foundation to support interculture in cultural environments through sharing in the arts, religiosity and nature. Diane is the first non-Indonesian to earn a Ph.D. in Kajian Budaya from Universitas Udayana, Bali where soon after the Rector appointed her as a volunteer Associate Professor.

Wednesday Forum – 06 April 2022

In this talk I would like to talk about the role that AI can play regarding religion. Since I come from a Buddhist culture, my example will be mostly from Buddhism, but I intend that my talk will be applicable to AI and other religions too. Among the questions that I will be addressing are: With the advent and rapid development of AI, what kind of impact will AI have on religion? There are many aspects of the impact that we can discuss. AI can be used to help the practicing of religion in various ways. An example of this is the robot monk in Japan. The robot can recite Buddhist sutras and practitioners can gather around it to listen to the sutra. Secondly, AI can be used to help with analyzing religious texts, such as doing concordances and searching for passages. This can be of great help to those who have to go through a large amount of texts everyday. Thirdly, AI can be used as an engine inside apps that aid with meditation. There are several apps that claim to do this. I will then reflect on these developments and will ask what do AI’s increasing roles in our religious lives and practices actually mean. Can AI itself become religious? If so, what does this signify in terms of our religions?

Soraj Hongladarom is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Ethics of Science and Technology at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. He has published books and articles on such diverse issues as bioethics, computer ethics, and the roles that science and technology play in the culture of developing countries. His concern is mainly on how science and technology can be integrated into the life-world of the people in the so-called Third World countries, and what kind of ethical considerations can be obtained from such relation. A large part of this question concerns how information technology is integrated in the lifeworld of the Thai people, and especially how such integration is expressed in the use of information technology in education. He is the author of The Online Self and A Buddhist Theory of Privacy, both published by Springer. His articles have appeared in The Information Society, AI & Society, Philosophy in the Contemporary World, and Social Epistemology, among others.